The short version
Phoenix runs on a single server, maintained by one person. It encrypts traffic, checks who every person and robot is, and keeps each household's data to that household. It has not been through a formal security audit, and this page says plainly where it is not hardened.
If you find a vulnerability, please report it privately to [email protected] before disclosing it publicly.
1. What is protected
The assets worth protecting are your account's credentials, your robot's credentials, and the personal data described in the privacy policy: photographs, messages, locations and voice. Phoenix keeps each household's data to that household. It is not built to withstand an attacker who already controls the server itself.
2. How access is controlled
- People sign in with an email address and password. Passwords are stored hashed, never in plain text. A successful sign-in issues a session cookie that every console request is checked against; the cookie is HttpOnly, so scripts on the page cannot read it.
- Robots connect over TLS and authenticate with their own genuine credentials. Requests from a robot are signed, and the signature is verified before the request is served.
- Linking a robot to your account uses a one-use code from your console. It expires after fifteen minutes and is stored only as a hash.
- The console reaches the services behind it with the signed-in account's own keys rather than a shared administrative credential, so a session can only reach what that account could reach.
- Administration is available only to accounts marked as administrators, and the server checks that mark on every administrative request. There is no shared admin password.
3. How the service is run
- All traffic to Phoenix is encrypted with TLS, using a publicly trusted certificate.
- A firewall admits only web traffic and the operator's SSH administration. Phoenix's own services listen only on the server itself, behind a reverse proxy.
- The website is served through Cloudflare, which screens it for abuse. Robot traffic goes straight to the server.
- The service runs as an unprivileged user. Its configuration secrets and its data are readable only by that user and the server's administrator.
4. What is not hardened
Stated plainly, because a security page that only lists strengths is not a security page:
- Phoenix has not undergone an independent security audit or penetration test.
- Sign-in allows ten attempts per address and email address in fifteen minutes, but there is no account lockout.
- There is no multi-factor authentication.
- Some compatibility surfaces reproduce the behaviour of a service designed around 2016, and those behaviours cannot be modernised without breaking the robot that depends on them.
- Several console surfaces are read-only or partial, and are labelled as such in the interface.
5. Code that runs in your browser
Phoenix carries a very small dependency footprint, a single external runtime dependency, which keeps the amount of third-party code running beside your household's data small enough to reason about.
The website's and console's own code, including their front-end libraries, is served from this server rather than a CDN. This website loads Google Analytics for aggregate usage; it does not receive robot or account content. See Privacy for what it receives.
6. Reporting a vulnerability
If you believe you have found a security problem, please email [email protected] before disclosing it publicly, and allow a reasonable time for a fix.
A useful report includes what you found, where, how to reproduce it, and what an attacker could achieve with it. There is no bug-bounty programme; there is genuine gratitude, and credit if you would like it.
Test only with your own account and your own robot, and never against anyone else's data: someone's photographs of their family are on the other side of it. To test heavily, run your own copy of the open-source server.
7. Scope
In scope: Phoenix as it runs at jibo.io, meaning the website, the console and the robot API, and the open-source code behind it.
Out of scope: denial-of-service testing, social engineering, the physical server and its hosting provider, Cloudflare, Google Analytics, OpenRouter and TypeSafe, and Jibo's original system software and hardware.
See also: Terms of use and Privacy policy.